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Comment: Sit-Ins and State Action-
Mr. Justice Douglas, Concurring 
KENNETH L. K.ARsr"f, AND Wrr.LIAM W. VAN ALsTYNE**~ 
Last December the Supreme Court decided three "sit-in" cases. 
In Garner v. Louisiana/ the Court struck down disturbing-the-
peace convictions of sixteen young Negroes whose only allegedly 
criminal activity was to sit at "white" lunch counters in a depart-
ment store, a drug store, and a bus terminal, all in Baton Rouge. 
The opinion of the Chief Justice for the majority was a disappoint-
ment for those who had hoped for a sweeping expansion of the 
doctrine of state action under the fourteenth amendment. It rested 
on grounds which were as drab as they are now familiar: 
In the view we take of the cases we find it unnecessary to reach the 
broader constitutional questions presented, and in accordance with our 
practice not to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is re-
quired by the precise facts presented in the record, for the reasons herein-
after stated, we hold that the convictions in these cases are so totally 
devoid of evidentiary support as to render them unconstitutional under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 
With a citation to Thompson v. City of Louisville,8 the Court's con-
stitutional analysis was over; it remained to examine the Louisiana 
statute to determine the elements of the crime, and to demonstrate 
by references to the several records that the convictions did not "rest 
• A.B., University of California, Los Angeles, 1950; LL.B., Harvard University, 1953; 
Professor of Law, Ohio State University. 
•• B.A., University of Southern California, 1955; LL.B., Stanford University, 1958; 
Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University. 
1. 368 U.S. 157 (1961). The Gamer case was argued and decided along with Briscoe 
v. Louisiana and Hoston v. Louisiana. In Gamer, two Negro students from Southern Uni-
versity "sat in" a drugstore at its lunch counter, after one of them had just bought an 
umbrella elsewhere in the store. The store served both Negroes and whites, but segregated 
the races in its seating arrangements. In Briscoe, seven Negro students "sat in" the res-
taurant in the local Greyhound Bus Terminal, which also maintained segregated seating. 
In Haston, seven Negro students "sat in" a Kress department store at the "white" lunch 
counter, and did not change seats when they were told that they could be served at the 
counter across the aisle. Each of the students was arrested, see text accompanying note 28 
infra, tried, and convicted for disturbance of the peace; each defendant was "sentenced to 
imprisonment for four months, three months of which would be suspended upon the pay-
ment of a fine of $100." 368 U.S. at 161. 
2. Id. at 163. 
3. 362 u.s. 199 (1960). 
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upon any evidence which would support a finding that the peti-
tioners' acts caused a disturbance of the peace."' 
But there was something for everyone in the Garner case. Those 
who wanted an opinion on the broader constitutional questions got 
one from Mr. Justice Douglas. Because his reading of the Louisiana 
Supreme Court opinions interpreting the statute required the con-
clusion that the accused Negroes had committed a violation, he 
reached the question of state action. While prediction is risky, it 
seems likely that if the Garner case is remembered at all, it will be 
remembered for Mr. Justice Douglas's concurring opinion. 
The traditional nature of the opinion's opening gambit does not 
permit adequate psychological defense against the dazzling moves 
which are to come: 
It is, of course, state action that is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, not the actions of individuals.5 
Of course. The reader may settle back, awaiting an extension on 
the mechanics of Shelley v. Kraemer;6 the arrests were made by 
policemen, and the convictions were adjudged by state courts. But 
Mr. Justice Douglas, having lost the last time he tried such a me-
chanical extension/ does not even cite the Shelley case. Instead, 
the state action requirement is to be killed with a new kind of kiss. 
Three seemingly independent grounds are asserted for holding that 
the private discrimination on which these convictions are based has 
satisfied the requirement of state action: (a) The customs of Loui-
siana, reinforced by the state's general legal patterns, maintain ra-
cial discrimination; (b) the restaurant business is "affected with 
a public interest," and thus subject to the regulatory power of the 
state; and in fact (c) the state, through its municipalities, had 
licensed these restaurants. 
The opinion thus discards the substance of the state action limi-
tation while maintaining it as a verbal fa~de. There is, of course, 
room for argument that the principle of state action has outlived 
any usefulness it ever had; such arguments have been made, off and 
on, ever since the adoption of the fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments. Occasionally it is said that there is no justification for a 
traditional state action limitation when certain interests are at stake, 
4. 368 U.S. at 163-64. 
5. Id.at177. 
6. 334 u.s. 1 (1948). 
7. Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 302-03 (1956) (dissenting opinion). 
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as in the voting8 or lynching9 cases. Others have urged a more 
thoroughgoing rejection of the requirement of state action,10 and 
perhaps the Court is listening. Griffin v. Illinois,11 while obviously 
distinguishable, certainly looks in the direction of an affirmative 
state duty to guarantee equality. 
If the state action requirement is not discarded, however, it 
seems unfortunate to assume that it can be satisfied by the sk.illful 
use of slogans. If the state action requirement is kept, no doubt 
the reason will be that it serves-or should serve-real values of con-
stitutional proportion. Even in a unitary government, some prin-
ciple of "governmental action" would be desirable as a protection of 
individual freedom of choice; the national interest in racial equality, 
for example, should not prevent an individual attorney from using 
racial criteria-or any other arbitrary criteria-in the selection 
of a partner.12 When an individual's actions strongly affect the 
interests of many people, we may apply constitutional limits to his 
freedom of action, on the ground that the impact of his conduct 
in effect resembles that of governmental conduct. Something like 
this consideration probably stands behind Mr. Justice Douglas's 
first ground, based on community customs. But when government 
acts, we do not worry about subordinating its freedom of action; 
government must justify its conduct, and cannot act arbitrarily. 
The federal system adds another consideration which supports a 
8. See United States v. Given, 25 Fed. Cas. 1324 (No. 15210) (D. Del. 1873); Pollack, 
Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. P.11. 
L. REv. 1, 19-23 (1959). The case of Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), may-but 
need not-be explained on this broad ground. 
9. See Ex parte Riggins, 134 Fed. 404, 409 (N.D. Ala. 1904); Hale, Rights Under 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against Iniuries Inflicted by Private Individuals, 
6 LAw. GUILD REv. 627, 638 (1946). For similar tendencies in other contexts, e.xpress or 
implied, see Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956), 70 HAR.v. L. REv. 
1299 (1957) (education); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Pro-
tection of the Law", 50 CoLUM. L. REv. 131 (1950) (land ownership or use; access to 
public accommodations). 
10. For a recent example, Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 
3, 26-62 (1883), is echoed in HAruus, THE QtmsT FOR EQUALITY 42 (1960): "The clause 
does more, therefore, than condemn unequal state laws or the unequal enforcement of 
equal laws; it requires the states to provide or afford equal protection of the laws. Neither 
a strenuous exercise in philology nor an examination of usage in 1866 is required to define 
the word 'deny.' It meant then within the context of the amendment what it meant long 
before and continues to mean, to refuse to grant, to withhold, to forbid access to, to refrain 
from giving some claim, right, or favor. Accordingly, the prohibition against the denial 
of equal protection of the laws is the same thing as a positive requirement which could 
read, 'Every state shall afford, or furnish, every person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.' " 
11. 351 u.s. 12 (1956). 
12. We assume the absence of state fair employment legislation. Even in the absence 
of such legislation, the state action balance may not fall the same way in the case of a sixty-
man law firm which rejects Negro attorneys on racial grounds. 
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requirement of state action before constitutional limits are to be 
applied. Such a doctrine decentralizes both the administration of 
nationally adopted standards and the effective decision whether to 
promote or retard various competing policies.13 
The most unsettling aspect of Mr. Justice Douglas's concurring 
opinion in the Garner case is that it ignores these interests, and lends 
support to treatment of the state action requirement as a gimmick. 
State action is once again viewed as a kind of conceptual hook; once 
the hook is found or invented, the racially discriminatory conduct 
is invalid, without further analysis. 
I. THE CusToM oF THE CoMMUNITY 
The Civil Rights Cases14 of 1883 are the bedrock for the strin-
gent state action limitations on the fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments-limitations with which the Court has been wrestling ever 
since. The cases invalidated the application of an early federal Civil 
Rights Act to the exclusion of Negroes from places of public ac-
commodation, holding that Congress lacked authority to legislate 
against "private" discrimination. Yet in the Garner case Mr. Justice 
Douglas employed an unguarded dictum of Mr. Justice Bradley in 
the Civil Rights Cases to reach a very different result; the implica-
tion drawn from the dictum is that "state authority in the shape of 
laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings" provides the 
necessary modicum of state action so as to involve the equal pro-
tection clause.lC; He went on to demonstrate that at least from the 
time of Plessy v. Ferguson/6 Louisiana has contributed to a custom 
of segregation by adopting it as a legislative policy with respect to a 
vast number of activities. On the strength of these premises, he con-
cluded that a Louisiana lunch counter proprietor in 1,961 is consti-
tutionally inhibited from segregating his customers because of race. 
No particular statute or ordinance compelled segregation in the 
business establishments involved in Garner, but Mr. Justice Douglas 
felt that the custom, observed by parallel private decisions and un-
coerced by state police or state laws, was sufficient nevertheless: 
13. 'Ve have more fully stated our views on the values represented by the state action 
limitation in Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1961). For appli-
cation of these views in the sit·in context sec id. at 52-57. 
14. 109 u.s. 3 (1883). 
15. Id. at 17, quoted in 368 U.S. at 178. The emphasis was added by Mr. Justice 
Douglas. 
16. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
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If these proprietors also choose segregation, their preference does not 
make the action "private," rather than "state," action.17 
If he is correct, and if he ultimately persuades the Court to adopt 
this view, then there is no area of social intercourse in the South 
which is free from the constitutional protections against state ac-
tion, since the custom is generally one of segregation. Moreover, 
since virtually every federal civil rights statute enacted since r866 
speaks of "custom" as sufficient to bring a defendant within its pro-
visions/8 acceptance of Mr. Justice Douglas's interpretation plus 
immediate enforcement of the federal laws would result in whole-
sale prosecutions and civil suits under existing statutes. 
We have commonly understood, however, that a free, individ-
ual decision is the very freedom of choice which the fourteenth 
amendment is not designed to foreclose. Will a common practice 
by white persons in a given community hereafter be sufficient to 
convert the choice of a local service or social club not to accept 
Negroes into state action which offends the equal protection clause? 
If convincing survey evidence should reveal that white families 
in Jackson, Mississippi, customarily refuse to rent rooms in their 
homes, or to offer dinner at their family tables, to Negroes while 
occasionally providing such accommodations for whites, can dam-
ages be obtained in a federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an 
offending family imprisoned under r8 U.S.C. § 242?19 And if it 
makes no difference that the club members or the family were ex-
pressing their own preferences and their own choice in the matter, 
have we finally resolved that the fourteenth amendment no longer 
requires state action in the South because of the prevailing custom, 
but that it continues to require some state action in the North absent 
a similar custom? Mr. Justice Douglas's opinion suggests an af-
firmative answer to all of these questions. In doing so, it unneces-
sarily confounds existing confusion about the fourteenth amend-
ment. 
A more careful examination of the interests involved in Garner 
and of the manner in which they compete for constitutional pro-
17. 368 U.S. at 181. (Emphasis added.) 
18. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958) (carrying the word "custom" through three 
revisions since its original appearance, Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 17, 16 Stat. 144); 
REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958). · 
19. Section 1983 provides an action for damages against any person "who, under 
color of any • • • custom" deprives another person of any right secured by the Constitu-
tion. Section 242 makes it a federal misdemeanor for any person "under color of any ••• 
custom" to deprive another of any rights secured or protected by the Constitution. 
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tection would have been helpful. As we have suggested elsewhere,20 
the interest of the defendant Negroes involved in Garner-type situ-
ations is essentially in obtaining light food and refreshment, and 
perhaps to enjoy the atmosphere and social contact offered in the 
restaurants.21 Qualitatively, this interest is not so substantial as 
interests in shelter, employment, education, or voting, especially 
where the policy of the management is not to exclude, i.e., to deny 
access to the light food and refreshment, but only to segregate. One 
might therefore expect that in view of the less substantial character 
of the interests which compete for constitutional protection there 
would be less judicial inclination to extend "state action" than in 
the voting,22 education,23 or housing24 cases. 
Quantitatively, however, custom is significant: it may demon-
strate the extent to which the interest of the minority class is af-
fected. If all but one of a dozen lunch counters are available to all 
persons on an unsegregated basis, the urgency of judicial action to 
change the policy of the single lunch counter owner to vindicate 
the minority interest is substantially less. But if all lunch counters 
are closed to Negroes, the harm to their legitimate desires is con-
spicuously greater. Thus the element of community custom is cer-
tainly relevant, although it surely ought not be conclusive as sug-
gested by Mr. Justice Douglas's opinion. 
Competing with these interests in access is the interest of the 
lunch counter owner in his freedom of choice-choice as to the use 
of his property, the economic risks he will incur, and the personal 
associations he will encounter in his trade. In determining whether 
the fourteenth amendment should be construed so as to deprive him 
of these freedoms, surely some inquiry as to their particular involve-
ment is demanded. If his establishment is provided by public sub-
20. Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 13, at 54. 
21. Additionally, Mr. Justice Harlan properly acknowledged the legitimate interest of 
the Negroes to demonstrate for the purpose of influencing public opinion with respect to a 
lawful objective. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296 (1940); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). There may be some doubt, 
however, whether the acknowledgment of such an interest takes sufficient account of the 
"reasonable time, place, and manner" doctrine of Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), 
in view of the feasible alternatives available to the Negroes to promote this interest in free-
dom of speech outside the premises. Unassisted by the vagueness of the local ordinances, 
the equivocal role of the managers in the Garner and Haston cases, and the aggressiveness 
of the local police, perhaps the invasion of the interest in freedom of expression under the 
circumstances would not have been unconstitutional. This is not to suggest that a consid-
eration of the free speech issue is irrelevant in determining what interests were in the 
balance, but only to say that its involvement here was comparatively slight. 
22. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
23. Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956). 
24. Ming v. Horgan, 3 RACE REI.. L. REP. 693 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1958). 
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sidy, if it is clear that he would sustain no loss of trade by pursuing 
a nondiscriminatory policy, and if he has no personal contact with 
his customers, the case stands on an entirely different footing, and 
correspondingly there is less reason to exempt him from the full 
measure of equal protection required by the fourteenth amend-
ment. These are matters which Mr. Justice Clark doubtless held 
in mind in the Burton case,25 and they are equally relevant here. 
Mr. Justice Douglas apparently would make no such distinctions, 
but would treat these "opposite" cases identically. 
Additionally, a substantial difference might be made by a more 
particular inquiry into the effect of the local custom in depriving 
the lunch counter owner of his own freedom of choice. If the deci-
sions to have the students arrested and removed from the stores 
were not made by the owners or managers of the stores, but were, 
rather, made by the police because it was their judgment that the 
students' presence by itself constituted a breach of peace, then-
parallel with the "willing buyer-willing seller" aspect of Shelley 
v. Kraemer26-there is not necessarily any conflict between the 
interests of the owners and that of the students; freedom of choice 
for both private parties has been foreclosed by the intervention of 
the police in response to third party pressure. Since third party 
interests in having the establishment segregated are clearly less 
substantial than the interests of the Negroes and those of the owner, 
it would be perfectly proper to apply the fourteenth amendment, 
as Judge Bazelon suggested in his opinion in the Hot Shoppes 
case.27 The situation would then be quite close to Shelley v. Krae-
mer. However, the Garner cases themselves are not wholly of this 
character, for the decision to segregate the lunch counters, and even 
the decision to call the police in at least one case, was made by the 
manager;28 thus the interests of the proprietors and of the Negroes 
were not all on one side, but in competition. 
It might still be suggested that the custom of the community 
effectively deprived the manager of his own freedom of choice in 
a more subtle fashion, justifying application of the fourteenth 
amendment. Thus, if the manager concludes from the custom of 
the white community that, should he follow a personal preference 
25. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
26. 334 u.s. 1 (1948). 
27. Williams v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 293 F.2d 835, 844-47 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (dissent-
ing opinion). 
28. 368 U.S. at 160, 198-99. 
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for desegregation, he will lose a disproportionate amount of busi· 
ness to his segregationist competitors, that he will lose his affiliation 
with various social organizations and otherwise be stigmatized and 
ostracized, and that his children may be harassed, the choice to 
maintain segregation is-by definition-not one he had any practi· 
cal freedom to avoid. Should the indirect coercion of the com· 
munity, as manifested by its custom, be used to transform his deci· 
sian to discriminate from a private one to a community-state one? 
Again, the answer is that this consideration is relevant in deter· 
mining the arrangement of interests which would be affected by 
application of the fourteenth amendment, but these subde forces 
ought not, of themselves, tyrannize over all other considerations. 
Moreover, in deciding what is a private decision and what is a com· 
munity-imposed decision, there is some risk in separating an indi· 
vidual's personal decision to segregate from the impersonal motives 
for making the decision. Carried to the limit, such a distinction 
would suggest that unless an entrepreneur's decision to segregate 
were solely the product of personal animus toward Negroes on 
account of race, it was somehow not really his decision. Although 
no personal animus may be involved, when the lunch counter 
owner assesses the risks to his business in terms of loss of other 
customers and loss of personal status among his community peers, 
it is at least his own assessment, however, rather than that of the 
police or other persons, which leads him to the choice of segrega· 
tion. Indeed, if we carry a theory of community determinism to 
its ultimate e."l:treme, it is quite possible to conclude that a decision 
to discriminate based even on a self-conscious animus toward Ne-
groes is still community-imposed; in the sense that the decision 
maker was reared in a segregated environment, was spoon-fed his 
social values, and was subject to the steady conditioning of the com· 
munity, he never had a "free" choice to become anything other than 
a segregationist. Thus the fact that custom may tend to dictate a 
decision to a businessman, pre-empting his own freedom of choice 
under some circumstances, must fairly be viewed as one element 
among many under the fourteenth amendment rather than as the 
critical link between the individual's racial discrimination and the 
state. 
The use of "custom" in deciding whether the critical quantum 
of state action is involved to invoke the fourteenth amendment 
might also properly vary according to whether the case involves 
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the self-executing effect of the amendment against a single estab-
lishment in a limited case, or whether it involves the general appli-
cability of a federal statute. Where the issue is raised as it was in 
Garner, the net effect of the result under Mr. Justice Douglas's treat-
ment is only to halt segregation in the very establishments involved 
in the case; the decision obviously has no direct effect on other busi-
nesses in the community. And although stare decisis makes clear 
that discrimination by other businesses would be violative of the 
fourteenth amendment, the amendment itself does not impose any 
type of penalty likely to deter a continuation of their segregationist 
policy. Such a situation may put the economic onus of desegrega-
tion on the first business required to desegregate by court order, 
since its customers may take their trade to those stores which con-
tinue to segregate. 
The ad hoc nature of judicial desegregation thus tends to make 
the first target of a sit-in demonstration the economic fall guy for 
the community. But where Congress has acted to forbid all busi-
nesses of a certain kind to distinguish among customers because of 
their race, the situation is improved in two ways. First, the legal 
duty to conform to a uniform policy applies to all alike; assuming 
the civil or criminal sanctions of the statute are fairly stringent, 
fewer enterprises will dare to hold out against the policy and risk a 
lawsuit. If the deterrent effect of the statute can effect a uniform 
change of policy with respect to all businesses similarly situated, 
the apprehension of any one owner that he will lose business by 
desegregating will be significantly reduced. 
Second, as has been said previously, for Congress to make the 
decision may justify greater deference to an interpretation of consti-
tutional power than the Court might justify without the backing 
of Congress. "Federal intervention as against the states is ... pri-
marily • . . for congressional determination in our system as it 
stands,"29 since "the representative nature of Congress and its sen-
sitivity to local interests-guaranteed by the manner in which it is 
selected"30 provide certain political safeguards against arbitrary 
federal power which are not present in the selection or operation 
of the Court. 
Finally, the consideration of custom also is relevant in evalu-
29. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 543, 559 
(1954). 
30. Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 13, at 11 n.19. 
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ating the exercise of local responsibility as that exercise bears upon 
the issue of state action. Where the community stands ready to 
vindicate the vital interests of its members by responsible local 
means, something of the value of federalism and its emphasis upon 
decentralized authority is sacrificed by gratuitously supplanting 
local remedies with protection by the national authority. Indeed, 
the willingness of the Court or the Congress to extend national pro-
tection may tend to sap the state's incentive to discharge its responsi· 
bilities toward its citizens, whether the context be race relations, 
aid to education, welfare assistance, or something else. 
Statement of the value of local decision making merely poses 
the issue and does not dispose of it in a given case. The desirability 
of responsible local government cannot be used forever to insulate 
local irresponsibility behind the orator's demand for deference to 
the abstraction of "states' rights." To the extent that the long·stand-
ing custom of the community and the continued indifference of its 
legislature make clear that protection of minority interests in the 
South cannot be achieved without national intervention, custom 
may properly be reviewed by the Supreme Court in determining 
the present necessity for construing the fourteenth amendment so 
as to offer those legitimate interests some shelter. In this connec· 
tion, the announced policy of Louisiana to encourage segregation, 
its repeal of the common-law rules affecting innkeepers, and the 
discriminatory custom of local businesses in keeping with white 
supremacy all indirecdy contribute to the predictable expansion of 
the concept of state action under the fourteenth amendment. 51 
II. STATE PoWER To REGULATE AND LicENSE 
In the latter portion of Mr. Justice Douglas's opinion, the chief 
reliance is on the line of cases which stretches from Munn fl. Illi· 
noil2 toNebbia fl. New York33 and beyond. Thus there is proposed 
a test for state action which is coextensive with the vast domain of 
what is traditionally called the police power. Of that power, Mr. 
Justice Douglas has said: 
An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruidess, for each 
case must turn on its own facts. The definition is essentially the product 
of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of government, 
purposes neither abstracdy nor historically capable of complete definition. 
31. See id. at 14-22. 
32. 94 u.s. 113 (1877). 
33. 291 u.s. 502 (1934). 
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Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has 
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclu-
sive.34 
After all, that was the point in Nebbia. The legislature had spoken. 
The Court abandoned earlier police power formulas in favor of 
genuine deference to the legislative judgment. The plain and re-
peated references in the Nebbia opinion to the presumption of con-
stitutionality have found reflection in a virtually unbroken series 
of modern cases in which the Court has consistendy rejected due 
process attacks on legislative regulation of business so long as the 
legislation has a "rational basis."35 
Now that the Court has properly resigned its former function 
as arbiter of the reasonableness of economic regulation, Mr. Justice 
Douglas proposes to make that very resignation the basis for the 
most sweeping application of national judicial standards of reason-
ableness in race relations. The conclusion does not follow, no 
matter how often one quotes Lord Hale's maxim about businesses 
"affected with a public interest."36 The issue is not whether that 
phrase can be made to serve in a manner remote from its author's 
context, but whether it is useful to make it do such service. 
It is clear, for example, on traditional police power analysis, that 
there is no due process objection to a statute which forbids motorists 
to drive on sidewalks or forbids restaurants to serve from un-
washed dishes. So also, after N ebbia and its progeny, motorists 
might be required, as a condition of being allowed to drive, to pick 
up hitchhikers at designated stands during a period of transporta-
tion shortage; restaurants might also be limited in the prices they 
charge or the wages they pay. All these activities are "affected with 
a public interest" in the sense of the Nebbia decision. That phrase 
is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power"; and it 
is plain that nothing more was intended by the e."{pression [in Munn v. 
Illinois] • ••• 
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the 
34. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 ·(1954). (Emphasis added.) 
35. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwest-
ern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949). Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), decided 
on equal protection grounds, can be regarded only as an aberration, as the dissenting 
opinions of Justices Black and Frankfurte_r make clear. Id. at 470, 472. 
36. The phrase comes to us through the opinion of 1\fr. Chief Justice Waite in Munn 
v. Illinois. See Fairman, The So-called Granger Cases, Lord Hale, and Justice Bradley, 
5 STAN. L. REv. 587 (1953). 
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absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt what-
ever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public wel-
fare • • • • If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a 
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, 
the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination 
to that effect renders a court functus officio.31 
Mr. Justice Douglas takes us one step-one leap-further. Be-
cause the Supreme Court will not exercise its veto to prevent the 
state legislature from keeping motorists off sidewalks, or requiring 
them to pick up riders, then the fourteenth amendment-absent 
implementing legislation-will not permit motorists to pick up 
only white hitchhikers, refusing rides to Negroes. Because the 
Supreme Court will not exercise its veto to prevent the state legis-
lature from requiring restaurants to be sanitary or to pay a living 
wage, then the fourteenth amendment-absent implementing leg-
islation-requires the restaurant to open its facilities to all custom-
ers, without discrimination based on race. Thus is the fourteenth 
amendment converted into a self-executing omnibus fair employ-
ment and civil rights act, covering all forms of racial discrimination 
which could be reached by state legislative power. Since there is 
now no effective due process limit in the Supreme Court on state 
economic regulation under the fourteenth amendment, every busi-
ness is "affected with a public interest," every business is subject to 
some regulation by the state, and-Mr. Justice Douglas adds-every 
business must refrain from conduct which, if performed by the state 
itself, would be objectionable as a denial of equal protection or due 
process. "It is, of course, state action that is prohibited by the Four-
teenth Amendment, not the action of individuals," but since practi-
cally all individual action is subject to some form of state regulation, 
practically all individual action is state action; so the reasoning 
goes.38 
vVe are on no firmer ground when we turn to the municipal 
37. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 533, 537 (1934). 
38. The decision to make the boundaries of the fourteenth amendment and the state's 
regulatory power coterminous can also be used inversdy, to eut back the state's power so 
that its civil rights legislation is justified only to the extent that it reaehes governmental 
action. A Washington court has in fact reached this bizarre conclusion. O'Meara v. Wash-
ington State Bd. Against Discrimination, 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 664, 682 (Wash. Super. Ct. 
1959). The Washington Supreme Court, in affirming on the ground that the statute vio-
lated both the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the privileges and 
immunities clause of the Washington constitution, found it unnecessary to pass on the issue 
of state action thus posed. 365 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962); 
see Van Alstyne, The O'Meara Case and Constittltional Requirements of State Anti-Dis-
criminatt"on LAws, 8 How. LJ. (Issue 2, forthcoming in 1962). 
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license aspects of the Garner case. Mr. Justice Douglas correctly 
assumes that a state cannot license a business "to serve only whites 
or only blacks or only yellows or only browns."39 But the fact that 
a state cannot require its licensee to segregate does not dispose of 
the problem of this case. The state action issue should not be de~ 
termined by reference to the state's power to condition its per~ 
mission to operate a restaurant on the periodic examination of the 
restaurant's cleanliness, the adequacy of its refrigeration and food 
preparation equipment, and the like. The interests at stake are 
totally different, and this opinion is objectionable precisely because 
it does not talk about particular interests, but about the public 
interest in general: 
[O]ne who operates an enterprise under a license from the government 
enjoys a privilege that derives from the people. • • • [T]he necessity of 
a license shows that the public has rights in respect of those premises. 
The business is not a matter of mere private concern.40 
The opinion thus equates state regulation with state assistance, 
perhaps on the assumption that any state connection suffices to 
satisfy the state action requirement. Such a confusion is common, 
but totally unjustified. If the state gives its assistance to a private 
enterprise, either by a direct grant of public funds or by more in-
direct means, then the personal, private interests in the enterprise 
are to that extent diminished. A man's lunch counter is less his 
casde when it is in a city-owned building, as Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Authority41 suggests. The proprietor who operates on state 
capital, or with the benefit of state assistance, does not have the same 
quality of private proprietary interest as his unassisted competitor. 
If the state's license were, as Mr. Justice Douglas says, properly con~ 
sidered as a kind of capital gift from the public, then the reduction 
of the personal interests of the licensee should importand y influence 
the resolution of the state action question. 
The license requirement in the Garner case, however, is only 
a form of regulation. It is forbidden to operate a restaurant except 
with a license. In order to get a license, one must apply, perhaps 
pay a fee or a tax, and submit to certain limitations on the conduct 
of his business. If he fails to comply with the law's requirements, 
his license can be revoked. Thus when we say that the operator of 
39. 368 U.S. at 184. 
40. ld. at 184-85. 
41. 365 u.s. 715 (1961). 
July 1962] COMMENT: SIT-INS AND STATE ACTION 775 
a restaurant must be licensed, the important consequence is that he 
cannot operate in certain ways: He cannot serve from unwashed 
plates; he must maintain adequate refrigeration for his food; if he 
fails to meet these requirements, he will be put out of business. 
Correspondingly, anyone willing to comply with the requirements 
will be licensed. There is no magic to a license from the govern-
ment; it has none of the significance of governmental assistance, but 
it does perform the state action trick for Mr. Justice Douglas. 
The opinion's principal citation in support of the license argu-
ment is to Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co./2 in which the Fifth 
Circuit properly held that a bus line franchised by a city could not, 
by its own choice, segregate the seating of its passengers by race. 
In Boman, the state had not required segregation; the company 
chose it. But the transit company, unlike the restaurants in the 
Garner case, had an exclusive franchise. It was, in other words, a 
public utility. One may grant that the phrase "public utility" does 
not solve problems any better than its counterpart, "affected with 
a public interest." But when the government prevents other would-
be bus lines from operating in competition with the transit com-
pany, three important consequences follow, none of which is pres-
ent in the facts of the Garner case. First, the government's exclusive 
license magnifies the impact of the company's decisions on the dis-
advantaged class-the Negro riders. There is no such similar re-
sult when a single lunch counter proprietor decides to segregate 
his customers, even though he may be licensed by the city. Second, 
the e.'rclusive franchise gives the transit company an important 
economic advantage, which it would not have in the absence of the 
license requirement and the policy of noncom petition; one who 
operates under an exclusive license plainly does enjoy "a privilege 
that derives from the people." Finally, the economic interest of the 
monopoly transit company is much less harmed by a judicial ruling 
forbidding it to discriminate by segregation than is the interest of 
an individual lunch counter proprietor. A monopoly bus line need 
not fear any substantial loss of business because of such a judicial 
decision, because there will be no segregated bus line to which white 
riders may divert their patronage. Thus the Boman case is dis-
tinguishable on both sides of the constitutional balance, in the in-
creased impact of the "private" segregation on racial equality and 
42. 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960). 
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in the reduced impact of the judicial decision on the interests of 
the person forbidden to segregate. 
We want to make clear that we do not assert that the facts of 
the Garner case cannot support a conclusion that the state action 
requirement has been met. Much less do we contend that the Gar-
ner case itself is wrongly decided. Nevertheless, the choice to rest 
decision on principles so broad and so different from what has gone 
before carries with it an obligation to base the new principles on 
analysis of the relevant interests, even though another technique 
may be easier or may provide more quotable judicial epigrams. 
One who is strongly devoted to the advancement of a uniform 
national standard of racial equality may be excused for impatience 
with what may appear to be a technicality. But the state action 
requirement is not a technicality; it serves legitimate and important 
constitutional purposes. If the requirement seems to some to be a 
quibble, a merely technical roadblock in the path of social advance, 
perhaps a measure of the fault lies with opinions like this one. 
